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Lessons to human resource managers 
from Rawls’ theoretical difficulties of 





Economic rationality, which plays an important role in complex justification of the 
collective choice of the principles of justice in Rawls’ theory of justice of fairness, does 
not avoid some implicit theoretical difficulties. These last led to an alternative concep-
tualization of reason, inspired by the Kantian conception of practical reason, namely 
“reasonableness”. Since business ethics is an effort to relate business to ethics, an anal-
ysis of Rawls’ theoretical difficulties along with the efforts to overcome them can help 
business ethicists and human resource managers alike. In this paper we seek lessons 
from Rawls’ attempt to couch the principles of justice in economic rationality, namely, 
the importance of questioning business’ rationality and the nature of business ethics. 
Keywords: ethics; fairness; economic rationality; human resource managers; Rawls; 
reasonableness. 
Resumo
Na teoria rawlsiana da justiça como equidade, a racionalidade económica desem-
penha um importante papel na justificação da escolha colectiva dos princípios de 
justiça.  Apesar do seu papel relevante, a concepção rawlsiana da racionalidade está 
associada a algumas dificuldades teóricas, conducentes a uma concepção alternativa 
racionalidade, inspirada na razão prática kantiana, a razoabilidade.  Como a ética em-
presarial tenta relacionar os negócios com a ética, a análise das dificuldades teóricas 
da concepção da rawlsiana racionalidade, assim como a solução de Rawls para as ul-
trapassar, pode  ajudar tanto os teóricos da ética empresarial, como os gestores, no-
meadamente os gestores de recursos humanos. Neste artigo, tentaremos retirar algu-
mas lições da proposta de princípios e justiça no quadro de uma concepção económica 
da racionalidade, nomeadamente a importância da reflexão sobre a racionalidade nos 
negócios e a natureza da ética empresarial.   
Palavras chave: ética; equidade; racionalidade económica; gestores de recursos hu-
manos; Rawls; razoabilidade.   
1  Doutorada em Filosofia Política pela Universidade de Lisboa e Professora Associada na ULHT. 
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Introduction 
Rawls’ theory of “justice as fairness” is an attempt to relate ethical 
principles of justice on an economic view of rationality (Rawls 1971, 
1993). In reality, Rawls states in A Theory of Justice (1971: 14; empha-
sis added) that “the concept of rationality must be interpreted as far 
as possible in a narrow sense, standard in economic theory, of taking 
the most effective means to given ends”. Roughly defined as the max-
imization of expected utility in classical and neo-classical economics 
(e.g. Smith 1776, Mill 1863, Friedman 1953), the maximization, con-
troversially reduced to the selfish maximization of expected utility 
(Sen 1987), faces technical (Arrow 1951), and ethical problems (e.g. 
the free rider problem and the prisoner’s dilemma (Campbell and 
Sowden 1985, Gauthier 1986, Sen 1977, 1987)). 
Rawls was aware of these problems and introduced some ethical 
constraints on economic rationality in order to align it not only with 
the substantive and formal ethical claims underlying justice (e.g. 
the public nature and generality of the principles, but also with the 
rationality of justice, which is also a public rationality (Rawls 1971, 
1993)). In fact, his ethical constraints provide a means by which we 
may explain how individual choice can have a public or general con-
tent. 
However, Rawls’ undertaking included some ethical and theoretical 
difficulties (Rawls 1993) that led to a revision of the economic con-
ceptualization of rationality via a peculiar interpretation of Kantian 
practical reason (Rawls 1993). In reality, this new conceptualization 
of reason, called “reasonableness,” and which complements Rawls’s 
former conception of economic rationality, is more compatible with 
morality than is economic rationality Nevertheless, since reasona-
bleness distinguishes itself from rationality or personal interest, we 
wonder if Rawls’ notion of reasonableness is inherently compatible 
with morality, in general, and business ethics, in particular.   
Since business activity, understood under the economic conceptu-
alization of rationality, can be incompatible with ethics (Reilly and 
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Kyj 1990, Sen 1987), an analysis of those difficulties as well as the 
attempts to overcome them can be fruitful to business ethics. 
In the first place, that analysis may help business ethicists and agents 
to avoid the same illusion that economic rationality can be ‘dressed’ 
in ethical principles, such as fairness, integrity, or honesty. In reality, 
the questioning about economic rationality has already been posed 
by business ethicists (Bowie 1991, Lütge 2005, Solomon 1993) and by 
economists (Akerloff and Kranton 2010, Sen 1987). Both address the 
ethical theory and principle(s) that underlie economic rationality — 
rational egoism and profit maximization (Sen 1987).
In the second place, since economic agents ought to choose among 
several alternatives of action, some of them deeply harmful for stake-
holders, inquiry into the nature of economic and management ra-
tionality that analysis may help the rational deliberation of managers 
of human resources when managing persons. Moreover, it may help 
to address the issues stated by Rutgers (1999) regarding the validi-
ty of economic rationality within organizations and the practice of 
management. 
Our endeavor is, however, controversial. First, Rawls’ conceptions of 
rationality and reasonableness are described in a theory constructed 
to a specific object — the basic structure of society —and not directly 
for the personal ends of people (Rawls 1971). Second, some authors 
sustain that the economic conception of rationality is only a heuris-
tic idea, a methodological assumption that does not depict reality 
(Becker 1993, Brennan and Buchanan 1986, Buchanan 1987, 2000, 
Friedman 1953, Wagner-Tsukamoto 2003). For example, economic 
rationality is not a model of human reason (Buchanan 1987, 2000, 
Friedman 1953, Baker 1993, Wagner-Tsukamoto 2003); he is only a 
methodological fiction, whose primary function is to heuristically 
instruct theoretical (practical) analysis (Wagner-Tsukamoto 2003). 
Accordingly, it is controversial to criticize scientific heuristic ideals 
from realist and empirical or behavioral claims (Wagner-Tsukamoto 
2003, 2005, 2008). 
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This controversy is much more stringent given the constructivist na-
ture of Rawls’ theory of justice (Rawls 1993, 1999). In reality, Rawls’s 
economic conception of rationality evolves under a constructivist 
theory. Given the complexity of these issues, they deserve themselves 
a separate research clarifying not only the epistemological and me-
ta-ethical nature of Rawls’ theory of justice, as well as our perspec-
tive on these issues.  
Considering the main issue stated above, this paper has two parts. 
In the first, we  analyze the difficulties of Rawls’ construction of an 
ethical theory of justice under an economic rationality. We begin by 
briefly presenting the role of economic rationality in justice as fair-
ness and explain how it leads to theoretical and ethical difficulties, 
explaining the emergence of reasonableness and its main problem. 
In the second part we examine the impact of those difficulties on 
business ethics. 
  
I — The role of economic rationality in justice as fairness
Rawls’ economic conception of rationality leads to theoretical and 
ethical difficulties and problems, mainly in everyday life.
1 The importance of economic rationality in collective and 
individual rational choice
Regardless of the unavoidable complexity and difficulty of Rawls’ 
theory of justice, Rawls’ justice of fairness remits lastly to the con-
cept of fairness. Among its complex meanings (see Rawls 1971, 2001), 
fairness is an ideal of a person who is understood as being free and 
equal, and who is provided with a sense of justice and a concept of 
good, which are in Rawls’ thought moral powers (Rawls 1971: 19, 
1993: 19, 30, 2001: 18-19). Fairness is also a contractual ideal of justifi-
cation of the principles of justice (Rawls 1971). As a principle of justi-
fication, the contract claims that the validity of principles is based on 
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its collective acceptability, framed by the principle of free and equal 
persons. This implies that in the contractual choice no one should be 
in an advantageous position and make illegitimate claims (Rawls 1971, 
1993). Accordingly, the establishment of the principles of justice re-
sults from a collective choice of free and equal persons in the original 
position. As only a hypothetical concept, which refers to a collective 
rational choice or a contract between persons seen as free and equal 
(Rawls 1971, 1993), that choice eliminates the hazards of natural dis-
tribution of qualities and the social contingencies, as social advantag-
es in the search for economic and political benefits. 
This rational choice is problematic, however, from the perspective of 
rationality itself. In fact, economic reason is not sufficient for a fair 
behavior. Since it merely sets out the need to minimize the risk of 
losses, whatever the referent of these losses (e.g. self-respect), eco-
nomic rationality is intrinsically amoral. This amorality challenges 
the claim of fairness, namely the ideal that no one should be in an 
advantageous position and make illegitimate claims, compromising 
the fair choice of the principles of justice. Moreover, the collective 
choice’s description under the economic concept of rationality is 
challenged by the well-known paradox of collective rational choice, 
namely the prisoner’s dilemma (Rawls 1971). This dilemma describes 
an interdependent rational choice involving two separate agents, 
which leads to the worst collective results for individuals involved 
in the collective choice. Since the content of the principles of justice 
from a collective rational choice —   when people are free and equal 
these principles cannot be imposed by any entity superior to any-
one else —  as in the prisoner’s dilemma, the collective choice of the 
principles of justice can lead to the worst individual and social alter-
native. For example, in the original position persons seek “to win for 
themselves the highest index of primary social goods, since this en-
ables them to promote their conception of the good most effectively 
whatever it turns out to be” (Rawls 1971: 144). Primary social goods 
are “things that every rational man is presumed to want [and] are 
rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth” 
(Rawls 1971: 63). The best alternative (the best conception of justice) 
is one that offers the highest index of primary social goods, i.e. more 
rights, liberties, powers, opportunities, income, and wealth than the 
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alternatives. If each person seeks “to win for themselves the highest 
index of primary social goods” (Rawls 1971: 144), the worst alterna-
tive would be the one that offers the lowest index of primary social 
goods, i.e. fewer rights, liberties, powers, and opportunities, as well 
as less income and wealth. 
To avoid this undesirable consequence, as well as the accordance to 
the claims of fairness — namely the universality and public nature of 
the principles (Rawls 1971) — through the fairness of the circumstanc-
es, Rawls’ theory of justice imposes some constraints on the collective 
choice of the principles. The veil of ignorance is one of the main con-
straints imposed to the economic conception of rationality. In accord-
ance with this veil, the choice of principles excludes the aspects of 
social reality, which seem arbitrary from the perspective of persons 
seen free and equal (e.g. the “place in society, class position or social 
status (…)[the] fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abil-
ities [the] intelligence and strength, and the like” (Rawls 1971: 137). 
If the collective choice is not made under that veil, the claims of fair-
ness (e.g. the equal person) would not be transferred into the rational 
choice. Therefore, the choice of the principles of justice would not be 
fair, i.e. would result from advantageous positions and illegitimate 
claims. On the contrary, the constraints of the veil of ignorance on the 
collective choice under an economic conception of rationality avoids 
the situation in which that collective choice can be biased by individ-
ual interests.
1.1 Rationality in everyday life
If the ethical constraints, which are valuable only in the hypothetical 
collective choice, avoid the consequences of the prisoner’s dilemma, 
they cannot prevent individual ethical failure in everyday life, i.e. 
free rider behavior (Rawls 1971). Actually, if persons collectively ig-
nore their personal ends in the choice of the principles of justice, they 
try to attain them in everyday life. In reality, those ends are impor-
tant since, not only a person’s good “comprises final ends and not 
only primary goods” (Rawls 1971: 398), but also “a person’s good is 
determined by what is for him the most rational plan of life given 
reasonably favorable circumstances” (Rawls 1971: 395). Among the 
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criteria to define a rational plan of life, which determines personal 
good, Rawls includes its consistency with the principles of rational 
choice, namely the principle of maximization of “the expected net 
balance of satisfaction” (Rawls 1971: 416), and deliberative ration-
ality (Rawls 1971). Regardless of the complexity, differences and the 
complementarity between these forms of rationality, economic ra-
tionality is valuable both to the collective choice of the principles in 
the original position, and for attaining personal ends in everyday life. 
Contrary to what happens in the collective choices of the principles 
of justice, chosen under a veil of ignorance, persons try attain their 
ends with full knowledge of all circumstances and contingencies. 
However, according to this full knowledge of facts, it can be rational 
that individuals may benefit from the provision of public goods in the 
pursuit of their own interests even while not contributing anything, 
themselves. For example, the tax-dodger is a rational individual who 
profits from public goods, but avoids doing his share (Rawls 1971). For 
that reason, if in the original position the veil of ignorance imposes 
ethical constraints on economic rationality, it is necessary to ensure 
that persons will not choose their aims or the means to attain them 
outside the limits of the principles of justice. If they did, it would not 
be possible to avoid the clash between the collective ethical choice 
in the original position and the individual choices in everyday life, 
which would undermine the well-ordered society. Consequently, as 
well as in the original position the knowledge of all circumstances 
and contingencies can biase the fair collective choice of the principles 
of justice, the required full knowledge of all circumstances and con-
tingencies to realize personal conception of the goods can increase 
the gap between the public principles of justice and the individual 
rational choice in everyday life. For that reason, being aware of the 
risks of an increase of that gap, in the third part of A Theory of Justice 
(1971), entitled “Ends,” Rawls describes the congruence of the princi-
ples of justice with the individual choice of ends, i.e. the congruence 
between justice and goodness. 
Briefly, the congruence between justice and goodness depends on 
the relationship between the rationality of the good, defined under 
the ideal of economic rationality, with the sense of justice. Therefore, 
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“the members of a well-ordered society, when they appraise their 
plan of life [or conception of the good] by the principle of rational 
choice, will decide to maintain their sense of justice as regulative 
of their conduct toward one another” (Rawls 1971: 514). The sense 
or feeling of justice ensures, consequently, that individual rational 
choice of ends, as well as the means to attain them in everyday life, is 
in accordance with the collective choice (of the principles of justice) 
in the original position. 
1.2 Some ethical problems with rationality in everyday life
Accepting that “[a] just social system defines the scope within which 
individuals must develop their aims (…)” (Rawls 1971: 3), and be-
yond the technical (Arrow 1951) and empirical difficulties (Schwartz 
1988), the constraint of economic rationality by the sense of justice 
cannot avoid some ethical and theoretical difficulties, mainly the gap 
between the collective and individual choices of the principles of jus-
tice in everyday life. This does not mean that there is no theoretical 
problem with economic rationality in the original position  (Barry 
1995, Choptiany 1972, Gauthier 1986, et al.).
Nevertheless, because moral dilemmas occur in everyday life, and 
not neglecting the relationship between actual rational decision and 
the principles of justice, we will not dwell on the theoretical prob-
lems with economic rationality in the original position. 
1.2.1 The gap between rationality and ethical principles in 
everyday life
First of all, there is a gap between the collective choice of the princi-
ples and the individual choice of the conception of the good because 
these principles may be an obstacle to the maximization of individu-
al particular interests. In this case, in the pursuit of their particular 
ends, agents face the dilemma of following the ethical principles and 
discarding those of economic or instrumental rationality, or discard-
ing moral principles and behaving only under the claims of the prin-
ciples of economic rationality. 
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Second, even if it would not have a gap, in justice as fairness the pos-
sibility of behaving in everyday life under the requirements of justice 
hardly can be related to any conception of rationality. Not only does 
reason for itself offer no suitable criteria to choose among competing 
ends, but there is also no procedure or method of choice in everyday 
life “which the agent himself can always follow in order to make a 
rational decision” (Rawls 1971: 552). For that reason, the justice of 
our decisions does not remit to reason, but to a moral sentiment — 
the sense of justice. For instance, because there is no procedure or 
method of choice in everyday life to make a rational decision, the 
sense of justice offers to rational choice the criterion to make a choice 
in accordance with the principles of justice. “The criteria of rational 
choice must take this desire into account” (Rawls 1971: 569). 
Thus, justice of fairness does not allow for a full explanation of how, 
from the point of view of rationality, a person can choose an end and 
pursue it through the right means and under the right principle(s). In 
other words, the principles of justice constraints can hardly be jus-
tified under rationality, in general, and in economic conceptualiza-
tion of rationality, in particular. Justice as fairness reminds us of the 
classical economic and neo-classical economic belief that any ethical 
behavior is per se irrational (Reilly and Kyj 1990, Sen 1987). In reality, 
and from rationality, a narrow economic conception of rationality 
any principle, valuable not only to one individual but also to a group 
of persons, or even to all persons may imply that instead of consid-
ering the constraints of rationality as internal, based on their sense 
of justice, free rational agents consider them to be external. Conse-
quently, instead of following their feeling of justice, reasoning under 
an economic conceptualization of rationality may lead to pursuing 
their individual ends regardless of public principles of justice. 
In this case, and aside from the controversy over the value of the 
contribution of Rawls’ theory of justice to corporations (e.g. Hartman 
2001, Moriarty 2005, Phillips 1997), the unavoidable understanding 
that any ethical behavior can be per se irrational allows with difficul-
ty for an ethical conciliation of the conflict between individual and 
collective interests that affects managers. Indeed, managers face in-
dividual/collective ethical conflicts and dilemmas (e.g. the individu-
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al protection of unjust dismissal and the responsibility to direct and 
control the employment and employees, the right to privacy at the 
workplace, and the search for efficiency). Accepting that the safe-
guard of collective interests depends on collective, social, or ethical 
principles, the irrationality of these principles will forcibly lead to 
“solving” that conflict in the perspective of individual interests  — re-
gardless of whether or not these last refer to individuals or corpora-
tions (Bryman 1984, Rutgers 1999). 
Nevertheless, and with regard to individuals, this solution does not 
avoid the undesirable consequences of the prisoner’s dilemma. What-
ever the level of individual activity — group, firms, community, coun-
try, or international system — individual decisions under economic 
rationality will lead to the rejection of any collective or aggregate 
action. Moreover, since organizations as institutions are systems of 
rules that define “offices and positions, with their rights and duties, 
powers (…) and the like” (Rawls 1971: 55), when leading by econom-
ic rationality, managers might be tempted to systematically violate 
the rights (e.g. the right of privacy at the workplace (Hartman 2001, 
Lippke 2010, Nussbaum and duRivage 2001), challenge every power, 
and disrespect their duties. Managers may also consider the rights of 
employees and customers of national or transnational corporations 
(Arnold and Bowie 2008, Varley 1998) as irrational from a corporate 
point of view. 
1.3 The emergence of reasonableness: the persistence of 
theoretical difficulties
Rawls acknowledged in Political Liberalism (1993: 53n7) that it was 
incorrect to relate the theory of justice to rational choice. He pro-
posed a changing conception of rationality, namely reasonableness. 
Inspired by Kantian practical reason, and contrary to the Kantian 
concept of practical reason, reasonableness is both practical and the-
oretical (Rawls 1993). Among the several criteria to distinguish rea-
sonableness from rationality (see Rawls 1993), reasonable persons 
are able to behave in accordance with universal or general princi-
ples, unlike persons who are only rational. 
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The emergence of reasonableness does not imply, in ethical behav-
ior, refusing rationality. Indeed, reasonableness and rationality are 
complementary ways of reasoning (Rawls 1993). The first is related to 
the intrinsic capacity to reason under universal and public principles 
and rationality in the pursuit of a conception of the good. Accord-
ingly, instead of referring to the sense of justice, the congruence of 
the principles of justice with the individual and social conception of 
the good refers solely to reason (Rawls 1993). From the perspective 
of reasonableness, the congruence between the principles of justice 
with individual goods is made under a public or universal conception 
of reason. Reasonableness is then the main condition for the relation-
ship between individual or social conceptions of the good with the 
principles of justice. It allows that in everyday life people are aware 
of the existence of public principles of justice, as well as the existence 
of a public reason (Rawls 1993, 2001). Therefore, individual rational-
ity clearly has a public content.
Reasonableness does not completely avoid the ethical gap between 
collective and individual choice, because if reasonableness denotes 
the capacity of thinking under universal principles, rationality refers 
to the capacity of thinking solely from the individual interests’ per-
spective. This duality precludes simultaneously joining the private 
or egoistic interests with the ethical and collective principles. For 
that reason, although reasonableness is more consistent with ethical 
claims than economic rationality, it seems not to offer a satisfacto-
ry perspective for ethical behavior, in general, and in business, in 
particular. Reasonable people are able to behave in accordance with 
public and general principles but do not have personal aims. Rational 
people have personal aims but are not able to behave in accordance 
with public rules. Accordingly, as the model of reason for business 
ethics, since reasonableness consists of a selfless conceptualization 
of reason, it cannot by itself explain how personal rational ends can 
be intrinsically ethical. 
We stress that, on the one hand Rawls himself distinguishes rational 
agents capable of framing their ends by public rules (Rawls 1993), 
from psychopaths, who behave only under selfish reasons. In reality, 
Rawls’ theory of justice does not suppose that every personal end re-
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fers to a rational selfish (or not) maximization of satisfaction or pref-
erences, from which individuals can claim the highest maximization 
of satisfaction of their desires, regardless of ethical concerns (Rawls 
1971, 1993). On the other hand, the difference between rationality 
and reasonableness can be seen under the distinction of two tasks 
of the “same” reason: to have particular ends (rationality) and to re-
late them to public principles (reasonableness). From this perspec-
tive rationality and reasonableness not only are interrelated, but also 
can design two different functions of human reason. However, and 
despite the fact that reasonableness has been a very fruitful model 
for business ethics (Lydenberg 2013), since the different functions or 
tasks of reason do not forcibly ‘cooperate’, reasonableness seems to 
not avoid the same difficulties faced by a narrow conception of eco-
nomic rationality. 
2 The impact in business ethics
The difficulties of Rawls’ theory of justice in basing ethical principles 
of justice on economic rationality offer tow main lessons to business 
ethics, namely lessons about the importance of questioning business 
ethics rationality, and the nature of ethics and business ethics. 
2.1 The importance of questioning business ethics’ rationality
The first lesson arising from an awareness of the difficulties of 
Rawls’ ethical theory in dealing with economic rationality is a ma-
jor concern about the nature of reason in business (e.g. Hausman 
and McPherson 1993, Sen 1977, 1987, Solomon 1993). Additionally, 
that concern also invites a reevaluation of the conceptualization of 
rationality in economics, questioning, for example, a pure axiomatic 
and formal conceptualization of economic rationality described in a 
normative, neo-classical economy. This is not a negligible issue for 
us, since if Rawls’ conceptualization of economic rationality is not 
free of psychological assumptions, in opposition to the neo-classical 
conceptualization of rationality (Hausman and McPherson 1993, Sen 
1987); it embraces both classical and neo-classical conceptualizations 
of rationality.    On the one hand, it is related to classical concepts 
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of rationality since it depends on psychological assumptions. On 
the other hand, it is related to a neo-classical concept of rationality, 
which considers that agents have a set of preferences that allows or-
dering a set of outcomes (Hausman and McPherson 1993, Sen 1987, 
Sugden 1991). Rawls states that, “a rational person is thought to have 
a coherent set of preferences between the options open to him. He 
ranks these options according to how well they further his purpos-
es; he follows the plan which will satisfy more of his desires rather 
than less (…)” (Rawls 1971: 143). Accordingly, despite the fact that 
there is no incompatibility between the normative conceptualization 
of rationally and the demands of morality — “utility theories place 
no constraints on the objects of preference” (Hausman and McPher-
son 1993: 686) — pure and axiomatic formal conceptualizations of 
rationality do not necessarily coincide with ethical rationality. More 
accurately, the significant efforts of neo-classical economists to ac-
commodate the concept of rational utility maximization with moral 
considerations (Etzioni 1986) may be condemned to failure. 
In the future, a consideration of business ethics may lead to deep-
er research into the nature of economic rationality (Hausman and 
McPherson 1993, Sen 1977, 1987, Solomon 1993). For example, re-
search into alternative approaches to economic rationality has de-
veloped considerably in the economic field (e.g. Akerloff and Shiller 
2009, Sen 1987, Simon 1983). However, our analysis of the difficulties 
of Rawls’ theory of justice warn us about the risk of relating concerns 
of fairness within an economic concept of rationality. If the concerns 
about fairness can “override the effects of rational economic moti-
vation” (Akerloff and Shiller 2009: 21), the maintenance of rational 
economic motivation — self-interest reduced to selfish interest (Sen 
1987) — can lead, on the one hand, to the above-mentioned con-
sequences of Rawls’ theory. The same is valuable for other ethical 
principles, such as altruism (Bowie 1991, and Frank 1988) or virtue 
character or character traits (Bhuyan 2007, Jackson 1996, and Solo-
mon 1993). On the other hand, as the claim of fairness seems to be 
inconsistent with the maximization of rationality, it remains unclear 
what conceptualization of rationality people can subscribe to.  
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As in economics, there are various attempts within the organiza-
tional literature to offer an alternative conceptualization of ration-
ality that differs from the instrumental and means-ends rationality 
(Bryman 1984, Rugters 1999, Towley 1999, Tsoukas and Cummings 
1997). In management theory and practice, instrumental rationality 
(or means-ends rationality) — which understands organizations as 
means to achieve goals — is not privileged-based on economic ration-
ality. It is mostly based on sociological and institutional approaches. 
However, the organization as a means to achieve goals, and the cal-
culation of means and ends within organizations, has been largely 
captured by rational choice theory, i.e. economic rationality (Bryman 
1984, Rugters 1999, Simon 1983). Indeed, although related to an “or-
thodox presentation of management” (Townley 1999: 291), economic 
rationality offers a framework in which to understand the ontological 
nature of organizations (Tsoukas and Cummings 1997), and to devel-
op organizational studies (Bryman 1984). Therefore, the acknowledg-
ment of the paradoxes of economic rationality within organizations 
(Petrick and Quin 1997) have implied some attempts to relate organ-
izations with ethical principles, such as integrity (Petrick and Quin 
1997, Waters 1988). Regardless of the changing content of rationality 
and similarly to the efforts of neo-classical economists to accommo-
date the concept of rational utility maximization with ethical princi-
ples, this endeavor may also be condemned to failure. For example, 
the shareholder or the ownership model of organizations — an ex-
tension of economic rationality into corporations (Post et al. 2002) 
— may imply that managers defeat their main goal, i.e. to maximize 
shareholders’ interests. Since the maximization of interest is the un-
derlying conceptualization of rationality, managers can transfer this 
reasoning to themselves. Thus, instead of maximizing the interests 
of shareholders, ambivalent managers may be concerned with only 
their own self-interest (e.g. the cases of Enron, Tyco, Parmalat). 
2.2 The nature of ethics and business ethics
The second lesson of Rawls’ failure in relating an ethical theory of 
justice to an economic concept of rationality deals with the nature 
of ethics in general and business ethics in particular. In fact, Rawls’ 
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theory of justice proposes an ethical theory of justice based on the 
complex concept of fairness. Although from ”Justice as Fairness: Po-
litical Not Metaphysical” (Rawls 1999) justice as fairness is defined 
as a political philosophy (Rawls 1993, 2001), it is also described as 
an ethical theory. It is “a theory of moral sentiments (…) setting out 
the principles governing our moral powers (…) our sense of justice” 
(Rawls 1971: 51 — see also Rawls 1971, 1993, 2001). It is also a mor-
al theory because “its content is given by certain ideals, principles 
and standards” (Rawls 1993: 11fn12). Rawls’ ethical theory refers to 
ethics mostly with principles, ideals, and patterns of behavior. These 
principles and ideals are undoubtedly important. However, their ef-
fectiveness and success depend on a way of reasoning. 
As we have seen, not only can fairness be challenged under an eco-
nomic conceptualization of reason, but the narrow economic con-
ceptualization of reason can be self-defeated as well. Even the col-
lective economic rational choice can lead to cooperation rather than 
competition, the prisoner’s dilemma clearly shows the limits of the 
selfish maximization of well-being (Hardin 1968, Sen 1987). Neither 
the elimination of personal interest nor its over-evaluation above 
everything can offer a suitable ideal, pattern, or principle of ethics. 
Accordingly, if the criticism against the economic conceptualization 
of rationality does not lead to a selfless ethics, or to the demonization 
of personal interest, ethics deals with personal as well as interest col-
lective or social principles.  
Although we wonder that the economic conceptualization of rational-
ity underlying Rawls’ theory of justice can reconcile individual inter-
est and ethical principles, we recognize that Rawls’ theory of justice 
has enhanced not only the awareness of the importance of the ethi-
cal and political role of principles of justice in society, markets, and 
organizations, but also our commitment with an ethical and politi-
cal tradition in which justice is the main ethical and political virtue. 
Additionally, when analyzing some theoretical problems of Rawls’ 
conception of rationality, we do not reject the importance of the con-
tribution of Rawls’ theory of justice to business ethics. His theory 
has been used to explore topics such as international business ethics 
(Hsieh 2004, Jackson 1993), stakeholder theory (Cohen 2010, Phillips 
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1997), duties/obligations of multinational corporations (Hsieh 2004), 
integrative social contracts theory (Dempsey 2011), political implica-
tions in business ethics (Heath et al. 2010, Moriarty 2005), methods in 
the field of business ethics (Doorn 2010), and principles of justice to 
the case of micro credit (Hudon and Ashta 2013). We agree with the 
majority of all these approaches that emphasize relevant contribu-
tions of Rawls’ theory to some area(s) of business ethics (personal, 
organizational, and international). 
Conclusion
We showed that Rawls’ extraordinary attempt to relate ethical prin-
ciples of justice on an economic conceptualization of rationality re-
vealed the limits of the endeavor. The ethical constraints imposed on 
the personal maximization of ends do not avoid the unethical prob-
lems of the free rider and the paradox of rationality, illustrated in the 
prisoner’s dilemma. 
The complementarity of economic rationality by a peculiar inter-
pretation of Kantian practical reason seems to offer a more suitable 
agreement between rationality and ethics and stresses that the na-
ture of rationality is at the heart of any ethical theory, in general, and 
in ethical business theory, in particular. The dual reasoning also does 
not allow for a satisfactory answer to the issues related to the validity 
of economic rationality within organizations or to rule the practice of 
management (Rutgers 1999). Accordingly, some difficulties with the 
role of economic rationality in Rawls’ theory of justice offered two 
main lessons to business ethics, namely lessons about the importance 
of questioning business ethics rationality, and the nature of ethics 
and business ethics. 
Therefore, an alternative concept of rationality should: a) reconcile 
personal ends with ethical public and general principles that ought 
always to be established by any rational agent when facing particu-
lar circumstances; b) integrate the economic maximization claims 
without facing the unethical and irrational consequences of the free 
rider and the prisoner’s dilemma; c) help to offer a consistent attempt 
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(Townley 1999, Tsoukas and Cummings 1997) to develop the concept 
of rationality in management thought and practice (Rutgers 1999). 
Similarly, although Rawls’ difficulties of economic rationality do not 
imply any minimization of his theoretical contribution to ethics, in 
general, and business ethics, in particular, a business ethics theory 
should not: a) eliminate personal interest or over-evaluate it above 
everything; b) lead to a selfless ethics or to the demonization of per-
sonal interest. Business ethics conception of rationality should recon-
cile personal interest with collective or social principles. 
The nature of rationality which is more suitable to business ethics 
deservers for itself a separate research.
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